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Abstract
In this paper, we study the inflation dynamics in an industrial inflation-targeting
country (New Zealand). Our objective is to check if the inflation targeting policy
has a transition period or not. Loosely speaking, we try to give some response to
the famous debate: if the inflation targeting is a framework or a simple monetary
rule. For this purpose, we use a frequency approach: Evolutionary Spectral Analy-
sis, as defined by Priestley (1965-1996). Then, we detect endogenously a structural
break point in inflation series, by applying a non-parametric test. This is the first
time that this method is used in the case of inflation-targeting countries. Our
main finding is that the adoption of the inflation-targeting policy in New Zealand
was characterized by a transition period before the adoption of this framework.
This period was characterized by many radical reforms, which caused a structural
break in the New Zealand inflation series. These reforms were made to lead back
the inflation close to the initial target. In addition, these reforms increased the
transparency and the credibility of the monetary policy. We conclude from our
frequency analysis that the inflation series becomes stable in long-term after the
adoption of the inflation targeting. This can be a justification of the effectiveness
of this policy to ensure the price stability.
Key-words: New Zealand, Inflation Targeting, Spectral Analysis and Struc-
tural Change.
JEL : C16, E52, E63.
1 Introduction
For many decades, central banks have adopted an exchange rate policy to ensure
price stability. Since the demise of the Bretton-Woods fixed exchange rate sys-
tem, there has been widespread desire to avoid excessive volatility in the exchange
rates of the world’s major currencies, which causes high inflation volatility. Other
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alternative solutions are failed, for example the target of the monetary aggregate
at the end of the seventies. In this period, inflation was an intractable problem.
After the breakdown of these systems, a number of Central banks began to con-
centrate efforts to manage inflation. At this moment, at the end of the 80s, a new
policy was born, which acts directly on inflation rate. It is the "inflation targeting
policy (ITP)". New Zealand was the first country that adopted it in March 1989.
Its official application started in February 1990. This new policy was considered
as the best way to ensure price stability. Today, several countries apply inflation
targeting policy. The practice of this policy preceded its theory, which come later:
Svenson (1999,2000), Walsh (1998), Woodford (2003) and Gionnoni and Woodford
(2003). As a result, most studies are interested in the monetary policy rule of this
policy. Other studies were concentrated in the pre-period of IT. So, this lateness
in theory arose some debate like the proper definition of ITP and its effectiveness.
To answer to these questions, we suggest that if the inflation targeting is a frame-
work, there is a transition period to this policy. If this policy is a simple rule, so
it doesn’t exist any transitory period to prepare the implementation of this policy.
In our knowledge, this paper is the first attempt to focus at the same time on two
periods : before and after inflation targeting adoption. Our objective is to check
if the IT policy is a framework or a simple rule and to check to the effectiveness in
this policy. In this paper we are interested in New Zealand because it is the first
country that adopted inflation targeting (IT) in full manner.
This paper has some empirical and theoretical contribution to IT theory. Em-
pirically, this is the first study on inflation targeting policy, which can identify
endogenously one break point. In addition, the frequency analysis gives us infor-
mation about the stability nature after the IT adoption. If inflation stability has a
long-term character during the period of IT, so we can conclude that the inflation
targeting is a successful policy. If it is a short time, we conclude that the IT policy
had a transitory effect on inflation series. The theoretical contribution consists in
our analysis result and interpretation. Indeed, we proved some institutional re-
forms before the IT adoption in the case of New Zealand. So, we conclude that
that the inflation targeting is a framework. The objective of these reforms is to
bring back the inflation level close to the initial target that caused a structural
break point in this period. These institutional reforms prepare the implementation
of this policy.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is an empirical analysis. Section 3
consists of data and results. Then, section 4 concerns interpretations. The last
section encompasses the conclusion.
2 Empirical Analysis
2.1 Theory of the evolutionary spectrum
In this section, we start with the definition of the evolutionary spectrum proposed
by Priestley (1965). Then, we present the estimation method of the evolutionary
spectrum (Priestley, 1965, 1988). At the end, we present the test that we defined
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based on the test presented by Subba Rao (1981) and the extension of Ahamada
& Boutahar (2002).
2.1.1 Definition
The theory of the evolutionary spectrum of Priestley (1965) is concerned with the
non-stationary process that is defined as follows:
Xt =
∫ pi
−pi
A(w)eiwtdZ(w), (1)
where, for each w, the sequence At(w)is a time dependent and has a generalized
Fourier transform whose modulus has an absolute maximum at the origin. {dZ(w)}
is an orthogonal process on [−pi, pi] with E[dZ(w)] = 0, E[|dZ(w)|] = dµ(w) and
µ(w) a measurement. Without loss of generality, the evolutionary spectral density
of the process {Xt}is defined by ht(w) as follows:
ht(w) =
dHt(w)
dw
,−pi ≤ w ≤ pi, (2)
where dHt(w) = |At(w)|2dµ(w). The variance of Xt at t is:
σ2t = V ar(Xt) =
∫ pi
−pi
ht(w)dw. (3)
2.1.2 Estimation of the evolutionary spectrum
According to Priestley (1965), the estimation of the evolutionary spectrum is per-
formed by using two windows {gu} and {wv}.
Without loss of generality, ĥt(w) is constructed as follows:
ĥt(w) =
∑
v∈Z
wv|Ut−v(w)|2, (4)
where Ut(w) =
∑
u∈Z
guXt−ue−iw(t−u). We choose {gu} and {wr} in the following
way:
gu =
{
1/(2
√
hpi if |u| ≤ h
0 if |u| > h
∣∣∣∣∣ (5)
wv =
{
1/T ′ if |v| ≤ T ′/2
0 if |v| > T ′/2
∣∣∣∣∣ . (6)
In this paper, we take h = 7 and T ′ = 20. We opt for this choice, as do Priestley
(1995), Artis et al. (1992), Ben Aissa & Ahamada (2004) and Ahamada & Bouta-
har (2002). According to Priestley (1988), we have E(ĥ(w)) ≈ ht(w), var(ĥ(w))
decreases when T ′ increases.
∀(t1, t2),∀(w1, w2), cov(ĥt1(w1), ĥt2(w2)) ≈ 0, if one of the two conditions (i) and
(ii) are satisfied.
(i) |t1 − t2| ≥ T ′, (ii) |w1 ± w2| ≥ pi/h. (7)
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2.2 Test detecting structural break
The test that we will present is carried out from the test of Subba Rao (1981). This
test consists of checking the stability of the spectral density around a reference
value. The approach requires the preliminary choice of a reference value k around
which are supposed to fluctuate the values of the spectral density. This test was
used by Artis et al. (1992), but they didn’t provide a rigorous justification for the
choice of the value K. We base this limit on the proof of Ahamada & Boutahar
(2002). This proof allows us to resolve the problem of the choice of the reference
value . Now, we will present the test.
Let {Xt} be a non-stationary process that represents the inflation date for each
country in this study. According to Priestley (1965), it has an evolutionary spectral
density ht(w). Let {(ti)}Ii=1be a set of size I representing the time scale in which
the elements satisfy the condition (i) given in (2.5). According to Priestley and
Subba Rao (1969), hiw = log(hti(w)) and Yiw = log(ĥti(w), where ĥti(w)is an
estimator of {hti}(w) according to equation (4).
µw = 1I
∑I
i=1 Yiw σˆ
2
w =
1
I
∑I
i=1(Y iw − µw)2 and Swr = 1σˆw√I
r∑
i=1
(Y iw − µw) when
r = 1, ..., I According to Priestley (1988), we have:
Yiw ≈ hiw + eiw, (8)
The sequence {eiw} is approximately independent and identically distributed nor-
mally. Stable frequency concept implies that, for all w ∈ [−pi, pi], we say that w
is a stable frequency of the process {Xt} if the value of the evolutionary spectral
density evaluated at w is independent of time. In other words, ht(w) = cw is a
time independent constant. Then, a process is stationary if its spectral density is
independent of time, and therefore if all frequencies are stable.
The test Tw that detects the structural break in inflation series consists of
testing the null hypothesis of the stability of w at the significance level α, i.e.
Pr(Tw > Cα)1. We will adopt the proof of Ahamada & Boutahar (2002) to deter-
mine the limited distribution of Tw based on the theorem of Ploberger & Kramer
(1992). According to this approach, the test Tw consists of detecting the maximum
value of Swr . This test is presented as follows:
Tw = maxr=1,...,I |Swr |, (9)
The methodology of the test presented up to now has some advantages. It can
detect the unstable frequencies and the date from which they emerge. Indeed, if
the instable frequency is close to zero, then the observed regime-shift concerns the
long-term, otherwise it is about an instability concerning the middle- or short-term.
1C0.1=1.22, C0.05=1.36 and C0.01=1.63.
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3 Data and Results
3.1 Data
The data were collected from the consumer price index (CPI) of all items from the
IMF International Financial Statistics (IFS) database. The inflation data for all
the countries,pi, are calculated from the CPI, as:
pi = Ln
CPIt
CPIt−1
(10)
The period of studies is 1980 Q1- 2007Q1. We opt of the choice of New Zealand
because it is the first country that adopted the ITP.
The choice of this period is due to two reasons. On one hand, the evolutionary
spectral analysis needs a large number of observations. On the other hand, we
need to compare our result with some other research on this topic, which uses the
same period.
3.2 Results
Date of Break
New Zealand (NZ) 1988Q3
NZ Inflation mean 0.0216 0.0062
frequency of Break pi/20 4pi/20 7pi/20 10pi/20 13pi/20 16pi/20 19pi/20
The table summarize the result of the identification of the break point of New
Zealand inflation series and the its frequencies of occurrence.
The result show the existence of one break point just one years before the inflation
targeting adoption. it appears very important result. So that’s why, we analysis
this result with the economic event occurred in this period to check if it’s the result
of the inflation targeting policy or no.
4 Interpretation
A table 1 summarizes the results. As we show in table and the following graphic.
Our methodology allows us to identify an endogenously break point in New Zealand
inflation series. In addition to this advantage, this methodology gives information
about the stability (instability) character. In this section, we try to analyse the
economic facts occurring in this period of study to show if our results are significant.
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The result of Table shows one structural change in the New Zealand (NZ) in-
flation dynamic. The break point occurred in the third quarter of 1988. Thus,
the NZ inflation rate has two different experiences: the first from January 1960
to the third quarter of 1988 and the second from this date up to now. We try to
explain the economic events during this period to check whether this structural
change was due to the inflation-targeting policy. During the period prior to 1988,
NZ had an experience of volatile and high-level inflation rates. This was explained
by some economic events. Indeed, at the beginning of 1960, the quarterly inflation
rate had a level of 2%. At the beginning of 1967, the NZ inflation rate started to
increase gradually. It reached a peak of 5% at the beginning of the 1970s. This
was explained by some economic events. Indeed, after the Second World War, the
principal trade partner was the United Kingdom. So, the integration of the United
Kingdom into the European Community in 1973 ended its economic relations with
New Zealand. This action represented a cultural and economic shock for New
Zealand. It caused a contraction in the actual production and unevenness due to
the loss of private income ensured by the Britannic market. These factors reduced
the New Zealand economic growth and increased the inflation rate. In addition
to this fact, the oil shock, which occurred in 1973, aggravated the situation. It
reached the bed of economic growth and high inflation rate in New Zealand.
The inflation stabilization was considered as a serious problem. Both monetary
and political authorities tried to find new instruments and new economic policies
to cure this problem. They made, in the 1970s, a wage and price control system.
This policy didn’t succeed in reducing inflation. At the beginning of the 1980s, they
introduced a new policy, which consisted of a general blockade of wages, prices,
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interest rate, rent, dividend and exchange rate, but didn’t succeed in stabilizing
inflation. The successive failures of these systems caused the collapse of the politi-
cal regime. The Labour Party won the legislature in 1984 and 1987. This political
party came to power with an idea to act directly on inflation.
Indeed, starting from 1985, much radical reform was undertaken. These reforms
were favorable to create successfully a disinflation environment. Indeed, after a
20% devaluation of the New Zealander dollar that put an end to foreign exchange
market crises, decisions succeeded at a fast pace. In 1985, NZ abandoned the fixed
exchange rate and allowed currency floating. So, the monetary policy became the
only instrument to cure inflation. At the same time, they renounced the price and
wage control. They involved the liberalization of capital accounts, banking liber-
alization, deregulation of interest rates, abolition of subsidized credit to interest
groups/borrowers, removal of state guarantees for all private credit etc. Also, we
find the liberalization of foreign investment to the effect that they had virtually no
restrictions on foreign investment. In addition, they introduced the liberalization
of international goods and services trade, the deregulation of product markets, the
rationalization of competition policy and the instauration of goods and services tax
in 1986 at the rate of 10%. In 1989, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand becomes
independent.
All these reforms contributed to increasing the confidence degree from the public
to the labour party. This confidence is resulted by the winning of the election in
1987. All these reforms contributed to the progress of the inflation rate decrease.
So, these were the reasons that contributed to the progress ensuring the falling
inflation rate from 1985 to 1988, as indicated by Figure 1 (inflation decreased by 9
percentage points after March 1985). According to Hodgettes & Clements (1989),
we can say that the fall of inflation starting in 1985 was due to domestic influences,
including gains and wage growth, and the firming exchange rate was revealed as
having the strongest contribution to disinflation over the whole of 1988. We sug-
gest that these reforms are an objective of the preparation of an inflation-targeting
climate.
We conclude to the idea of the inflation targeting climate preparation because, in
1985, the New Zealand Reserve Bank received the instruction to act directly on
inflation. In early April 1988, Roger Douglas (Brash, 2000) said "we should get
inflation down to a range of 0 to 2% per annum". We can conclude from the ci-
tation of the Minster of Finance that the inflation-targeting climate was prepared
and that is the date on which the ITP can be established. This date coincides
with the date of structural change in the inflation dynamic that we find. So, it is
the date of cut of the higher inflation rate. In this case, we can justify our result
by the theoretical conclusion of Artus (2004), who said, "The inflation targeting is
relevant when the initial inflation to stabilize is near to the target range". Thus,
we justified this conclusion empirically. Indeed, it is completely logical to find a
period that we name the "period of IT preparation climate". This period is char-
acterized by some radical reforms to establish a disinflation environment with the
objective of having a lower inflation level. Then, we can adopt the ITP to ensure
this level throughout the period. We suggest that these reforms must increase to a
7
degree of confidence on the actions taken by the policy-makers. This is the case of
New Zealand when, six months after this announcement, it gains its independence.
Our result appears very significant. Indeed, a recent debate exists about the date
of ITP adoption that we must consider. Indeed, Fracasso et al. (2003) consider
the date of April 1988 as the date of the official adoption of IT in the case of New
Zealand. Bernanke and Mishkin (1997) consider April 1989 as the official date.
Plantier and Scrimgeours (2002) say that the date of the official adoption of ITP
is February 1990. We suggest that, whatever the date of adoption, the break point
that occurred in the third quarter of 1988 was owing to the inflation-targeting pol-
icy. This point occurred because the case of New Zealand had an experience of a
high inflation rate before this policy. So, the inflation rate must remain at a lower
level near to the target range.
From this analysis, we justify the ITP causing a change in the inflation dynamic.
This analysis contributes to the theoretical literature of inflation targeting because
we define in this paper the notion of a "climate preparation period" occurring
before the adoption of this policy. Artus (2004) and Lee (1999) call it the disin-
flations environment, but they don’t provide any empirical justification. In this
period, we will prepare all the success conditions for this policy. In addition, our
analysis proves some responses to the debate of inflation targeting as a framework
or a simple rule. According to our analysis, it is clear that the ITP is a framework.
The second important result provided by our empirical methodology is given by
the frequency interpretation (shown in Table). The result and graphic show a fre-
quency of stability ensured since 1989. Our test suggests that the stability has a
long-run character. This is an attempt result. Indeed, the inflation targeting had
a medium-term objective of price stability. In the case of New Zealand, the first
PTA was fixed in 1989 and had a three-year horizon; after that, the New Zealand
reserve bank modified the PTA according to the economic evolution to satisfy the
objective of a low inflation rate. However, in 1993, the objective fixed by the first
PTA was prolonged to the end of 1995, so it ensured the continuity in the price sta-
bility at the medium-term inflation rate reached long-term price stability. That is
the reason we can say that ITP was a successful policy in the case of New Zealand.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we apply the evolutionary spectral analysis during ex-ante and ex-
post inflation targeting. The objective of this study is to examine the behaviour
of inflation few years before and after the date of inflation targeting adoption.
Indeed, most of the studies on this subject focus in the post inflation-targeting
period. However, if the inflation targeting was a Framework we must consider the
prior period of inflation targeting. If inflation targeting is a discretionary policy,
it is consistent to start study until the date of adoption. We use evolutionary
spectral analysis to study the New Zealand inflation series. Our finding appears
very interesting. Indeed, we identify a break point in the inflation series occurred in
the third quarter of 1988 (just before the official adoption). This result is supported
by the analysis events that occurred at this period. It is explained by the existence
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of some radical reforms, which aim at remaining the level of inflation close to
the initial target. So, these reforms build a disinflationary environment. So we
name this transition period to inflation targeting as "the Climate Preparation of
inflation targeting policy". Other important result concerns the analysis frequency.
Indeed, we find that the inflation series had a long-term stability after the inflation
targeting adoption. The result reflects the effectiveness of inflation targeting policy.
Our analysis has some limitations. Indeed, our empirical approach cannot detect
various break points. So, it is possible for the existence of other break points after
the inflation targeting policy that remain inflation in a high level, but this method
can not detected it. Some other question appears very important which we must
handle in future studies: if we can generalise this result to all inflation targeting
countries. Is it the case of the emerging inflation targeting countries?
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